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Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to document the relationship between intellectual capital 
disclosure and analyst following for biotechnology firms listed at the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange during the period between 2001 and 2010.  
Design/methodology/approach: Intellectual capital disclosure was computed from financial 
statements, while analyst following data was retrieved from I/B/E/S.  
Findings: The results show that analysts are more likely to follow firms with high intellectual 
capital disclosure. This finding is consistent with the fact that analysts wish to follow those firms 
for which they have more information. Our results also show that intellectual capital disclosure 
related to employees and strategic statements are the most important disclosures for analysts. 
Research limitations/implications: More relevant methods, such as survey or interviews with 
management, may be used to improve the information content of intellectual capital disclosure. 
Analysts, probably, deduce intellectual capital of a firm from interaction with management rather 
than financial statements. 
Practical implications: Firms in biotechnology sector can improve their information 
environment by disclosing more information regarding their intellectual capital in financial 
statements. 
Originality/value: Our findings shed light on the importance of intellectual capital in 
biotechnology sector for analysts. 
 
JEL Classification: G34 
Keywords: Intellectual Capital Disclosure; Information Asymmetry; Analyst Following; 
Biotechnology Sector 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout the entire period of the existence of the present journal, a vast amount of 
contributions pondering the information value of intellectual capital to external stakeholders such 
as e.g. financial analysts and investors have been offered. Although published in a competing 
journal, it is worth noting that Guthrie et al. (2012) accentuate this in a recently published review 
paper that relates back to an early overview article in the present journal. Intellectual capital 
lends itself naturally to studies of information asymmetry, because intellectual capital rests 
primarily on a managerial informativeness platform, while the stakeholders above generally do 
not have access to this information. Hence, several problems blossom in the communication of t 
information like intellectual capital, ranging from secrecy and sensitivity to complexity. In a 
seminal article on this issue, Holland & Johanson (2003) synthesize that capital market agents do 
not value intellectual capital because they do not know how to understand it. Somewhat 
provocatively, Holland & Johnson (2003) also suggest that this not surprising, taking the 
example that capital market participants typically do not understand even their own value 
creation proposition.  
In line with these notions, a few contributions have pointed to problems of analyzing intellectual 
capital for decision-making purposes (cf. Nielsen et al. 2006). For example, Mouritsen et al. 
(2003) suggest a methodology for analyzing intellectual capital and use metaphors of analyzing 
the financial report to give suggestions for how to analyze intellectual capital, whereas Royal and 
O’Donnell (2008) focus on methods more specifically for enhancing the analysis of human 
capital. While studies of how to use intellectual capital information for analysis purposes are 
rare, there are a multitude of studies published on the information content of IPO prospectuses 
(Bukh et al. 2005, Singh & Mitchell Van der Zahn 2007, Rimmel, Nielsen & Yosano 2009) and 
the content of analyst reports (Flöstrand 2006, Nielsen 2008, Abhayawansa and Abejsekera 
2009).  
In much the same realm, there are also several studies addressing the information environment in 
which the companies and the analysts interact, for instance being reflected in the content of 
intellectual capital in for example annual reports (cf. Arvidsson 2011) or sustainability reports 
(Cinquini et al. 2012). Lastly there are also some studies that are industry-specific in relation to 
the present article. For instance, White, Lee and Tower (2007) study the intellectual capital 
disclosures of Australian biotechnology companies, while White et al. (2010), compose a 
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comparative study of the information disclosure of biotechnology companies in the UK and 
Australia respectively. While using the companies’ disclosure levels as a proxy for information 
environment may be considered a normal practice, Nielsen & Madsen (2009) emphasize that it is 
important to remember that this may be problematic because corporate management may be 
attempting to portray their own message. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 briefly discusses arguments behind our hypothesis. Section 3 summarizes the data and 
Section 4 presents assessment of our hypothesis. Section 5 documents discussion on results and 
the paper ends with Section 6 where we present our conclusions. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
 
Modern corporation has given rise to principal-agent relationship – also known as agency 
problems. This relationship is characterized by a situation, where managers may adopt a 
behaviour that serves their interests at the expense of shareholders. Agency problems provide 
means and incentives to managers to consume more perquisites than previously agreed (Fama, 
1980). One of the ways to ensure that managers do not diverge from their task of serving 
shareholders is to provide as much information as possible. This information not only contains 
information about a firm’s physical capital, but also about its intellectual capital. Prior literature 
considers information regarding intellectual capital to be as important as the information 
regarding physical capital. Sofian et al. (2011), for instance, point out that, on average, more 
than 30% of a firm’s value is represented by its intellectual capital. The importance of 
intellectual capital is, further, enhanced in knowledge-intensive sectors (for example, IT and 
biotechnology) because intellectual capital typically outweighs physical capital in value in these 
sectors. Holland (2003) argues that intellectual capital is a pivotal component of in overall 
growth of knowledge-intensive firms and is a major source of their competitive advantage.  
 
2.1 Intellectual capital disclosure and information asymmetries 
 
Intellectual capital can be thought of as an information construct that provides value 
relevant information to outsiders about firm’s long-term sustainability. Hayton (2005) argues that 
unique resources embedded in intellectual capital allows a firm to enter new markets, gain first 
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mover advantages, and create high quality products. All of these characteristics are of paramount 
importance for anyone who wants to make an informed trade of stocks. Prior literature argues 
that failure to disclose information regarding intellectual capital can give rise to agency problems 
by allowing insiders to take advantage at the expense of outsiders (Thompson and Randall, 
2000). Given that traditional financial statements do not provide adequate information about 
intellectual capital, knowledge-intensive firms can become an easy target for expropriation by 
insiders. Henceforth, disclosure of intellectual capital can lead to substantial reduction in risk of 
expropriation by reducing information asymmetries (Arvidsson, 2011; Holland, 2006). We argue 
that disclosure of intellectual capital reduces the amount of private information relative to public 
information and results in lowering uncertainty of prospective benefits generated from 
uncapitalized intangible assets. 
Consistent with the above arguments, prior literature notes that intellectual capital 
disclosure provides stock market participants with more value relevant information about firms 
(Williams, 2001, Beattie and Thomason, 2007) and Canibano et al. (1999) document that 
disclosure of intellectual capital helps in increasing value relevance of financial statements. 
Consequently, the stock market’s understanding of a firm’s overall value creating activities and 
risks associated with them improves. Hence, it makes stock prices more efficient, thereby 
allowing stock market participants to trust information revealed through prices. Therefore, 
intellectual capital disclosure also leads to reduction in stock price volatilities (Garcia-Ayuso, 
2003). 
In addition to what is stated above, intellectual capital disclosure can also reduce 
information asymmetries by creating trustworthiness with stakeholders (Meer-Kooistra and 
Zijlstra, 2001; Bornemann and Leitner, 2002). As a result, we should expect firms with high 
intellectual capital disclosure to have more loyal customers and employees. Prusak and Cohen 
(2001) note that establishment of trust is one of the most important channels via which firms can 
ensure stakeholders’ commitment to a firm’s future. Intellectual capital disclosure should, 
therefore, lead to lower uncertainty regarding future prospects of the firm.  
 
2.2 Information asymmetries and analyst following 
 
	   5	  
Analysts are specialized agents that gather, interpret, and disseminate information. In 
doing so, they track firms on a regular basis, continuously scrutinize management behavior, and 
unearth any accounting irregularities committed by firms. Oversight provided by analysts is, 
usually, more than the supervision provided by board members, regulators, and auditors. Board 
members, for instance, meet only few times a year, regulators only review a small fraction of 
financial reports, and auditors only visit at the end of the fiscal year for a short period. One of the 
reasons for this increased oversight provided by analysts is their constant need of value relevant 
information. High quality information is an essential constituent for accurate forecasts and 
recommendations. 
In this paper, we argue that analysts are attracted towards firms that provide them with 
enough information to work with. Our conjecture is consistent with prior literature that 
documents lower analyst following for firms with high information asymmetries (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 1999). This strand of literature suggests that analysts are less 
likely to be attracted to firms with high information asymmetries due to their concern for 
reputation. Stickel (1992) suggests that more reputable analysts get higher compensation and are 
more likely to be promoted and less likely to be fired. In another related study, Hong and Kubik 
(2003) argue that being accurate is an important mechanism via which analysts build their 
reputation. They document that accurate analysts are more reputable than their counterparts.  
Analysts’ desire to communicate accurate information may not be the only reason for 
them to follow firms with low information asymmetries. We argue that, even if analysts are able 
to come up with accurate forecasts and recommendations for firms with high information 
asymmetries, it is not clear how their clients will benefit from their research. This is because any 
upside potential is likely to be exploited by insiders who can easily trade on information before 
anyone else. Bushman et al. (2005), for instance, show that analysts are less likely to follow 
those firms that do not allow their clients to benefit from their research. They show that firms in 
which insider trading restrictions are not enforced are less likely to attract analysts. 
Contrary to above arguments, plentiful of literature indicates that analysts are more likely 
to follow firms with poor information environment (cf. Lehavy, Li and Merkley 2011). This 
strand of literature argues that, analyst being service providers, are more likely to be required for 
valuations in situations where investors cannot value firms themselves or cannot rely on market 
values. Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that investors discount shares of firms with information 
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asymmetries. In another related study, Lins (2003) documents similar findings. Therefore, 
analysts are required to provide additional scrutiny in these firms. Consistent with these 
arguments, Lang et al. (2004) show that analysts are of more importance in environments where 
information asymmetries are high. They note that additional scrutiny by analysts in such 
environments is of significant importance for investors.  
 
2.3 Analyst following and intellectual capital disclose 
 
Given that disclosure of intellectual capital reduces information asymmetries by 
providing a transparent image of the firm, we argue that there is more likelihood that analysts 
will choose to cover/follow firms with higher intellectual capital disclosure.  
 
H1a: Firms with high intellectual capital disclosure should have higher analyst 
following/coverage relative to firms with less intellectual capital disclosure. 
 
However, reduction in information asymmetries as a result of high intellectual capital 
disclosure may also induce analysts to follow those firms where their services are needed the 
most. Analysts, being service providers, should be needed the most for firms where information 
is not readily available. We, therefore, hypothesize a negative relationship between analyst 
following and intellectual capital disclosure. 
 
H1b: Firms with high intellectual capital disclosure should have lower analyst 
following/coverage relative to firms with less intellectual capital disclosure. 
 
3. Data 
 
This paper examines the effect of intellectual capital disclosure on analyst following in a 
sample of biotechnology firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange during the period 
between 2001 and 2010. The following sub-sections will explain the data in greater detail. 
 
3.1 Intellectual capital disclosure 
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The annual reports from Danish biotechnology firms (listed on the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange) were used to compute the voluntary intellectual capital disclosure data. Voluntary 
intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports is scored using the index developed by Bukh et 
al. (2005). Bukh et al. (2005) use intellectual capital disclosure related to employees, customers, 
IT, processes, research and development, and strategic statements to develop comprehensive 
index. The index consists of 27 items related to employees, 14 items related to customers, 5 
items related to IT, 8 items related to processes, 9 items related to research and development, and 
15 items related to strategic statements. The disclosure information is scored either “1” for yes or 
“0” for no for each item. The categorical record is converted to a percentage for each company, 
by dividing by the sum of disclosures. In the case of individual dimensions, such as IT or 
strategic statements, the number of “1” scores was divided by the total number of items for that 
dimension. For example, if a company disclosed 9 of the 15 items for the strategic statements 
dimension, the score would be 60 percent (=9/15). This index has also been used successfully in 
plentiful of previous studies (Singh and Van Der Zahn, 2008; White et al., 2007). Table 1 
documents the descriptive statistics for intellectual capital disclosure during our sample period. 
Our results in Table 1 show that dispersion in intellectual capital disclosure gradually decreased 
during our sample period. For example, we report standard deviation in intellectual capital 
disclosure of 10.17 in 2001 and standard deviation in intellectual capital disclosure of 6.48 in 
2010. Surprisingly, Table 1 reports a great deal of variation in intellectual capital disclosure 
across our sample period. For example, we show that maximum disclosure occurred in 2002, 
followed by 2009, 2003, and 2004.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2 Analyst following 
 
We define analyst following by maximum number of analysts issuing annual earnings 
forecasts in a given year. Data for analyst following is obtained from I/B/E/S. Table 2 documents 
the descriptive statistics for analyst following during our sample period. Our results in Table 2 
show that analyst following gradually increased during our sample period. For example, average 
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analyst following was 8.80 analysts in 2001, while it increased to 12.30 analysts in 2010. The 
same observation can be made for median analyst following. It shows a gradual increase of 
analyst interest in the biotechnology sector. Surprisingly, we also show that dispersion in analyst 
following also gradually increased during our sample period. Table 2, for example, reports 
standard deviation of 6.26 in 2001 and 9.09 in 2010. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.3 Control variables 
 
Consistent with prior literature, this article uses a number of firm-specific characteristics 
as control variables. For example, variables representing historic performance of a firm were 
added in accordance with Lang et al. (2004). We use last year’s earnings per share (HISTEPS), 
and last year’s market-adjusted returns (HISTRET) as proxies for historic performance. Lang et 
al. (2004) argue that analysts may be interested in firms with strong historic performance. We 
also add log of total assets (SIZE) as a control variable. Brennan and Hughes (1991) note that 
larger firms are likely to have more analysts covering them. Furthermore, dividend payout ratio 
(PoR), operational complexity (COMP), total debt to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE), and 
earnings per share (EPS) of a firm is added to control for the information environment of a firm. 
All of these factors can reduce information asymmetries present within a firm. Healy et al. 
(1999) argue that the information environment of a firm is an important determinant of analyst’s 
decision to follow a firm. We obtain data for the above-mentioned variables from Worldscope. 
Table 3 documents the statistics for our control variables during our sample period. Panel A 
documents average values for control variables used in our analysis, while Panel B documents 
the correlation between different control variables. As is expected, Table 3, Panel A, shows that 
biotechnology firms have very low dividend payout ratios. We report median payout ratio of 
0.00% and average payout ratio of 13.40% during our sample period. Table 3, Panel A, also 
shows that biotechnology firms have very low leverage. Furthermore, Table 3, Panel B, shows 
low correlation between our control variables, thereby allowing us to include these variables in 
regression analyses. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Univariate analysis: Relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and analyst 
following 
 
This paper hypothesizes that intellectual capital disclosure is a significant determinant of 
analyst following in the biotechnology sector. In order to document this relationship, we divide 
our sample into two groups – one with above median intellectual capital disclosure and the other 
with below median intellectual capital disclosure – and compute the difference in average analyst 
following between the two groups. Our results in Table 4 show that firms with above median 
intellectual capital disclosure are followed by, on average, 12.39 analysts, while this number is 
only 8.30 analysts for firms with below median intellectual capital disclosure. Table 4 also shows 
that there is a significant difference in analyst following between the two groups. We report 
difference of almost 4 analysts between the two groups. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis: Relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and analyst 
following 
 
In this section, we document the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and 
analyst following using panel regression with fixed effects. In order to do so, we use analyst 
following (ANALYST) as a dependent variable and intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) as an 
independent variable. Our methodology is similar to that of Lang et al. (2004). Furthermore, we 
also include a number of control variables in our regression equation. These variables are log 
total assets (SIZE), total debt to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE), dividend payout ratio (PoR), 
earnings per share (EPS), operational complexity (COMP), last year’s earnings per share 
(HISTEPS), and last year’s market-adjusted returns (HISTRET), and year dummies (YDUM). 
Our basic regression takes the following form. It is important to mention here that we perform a 
Hausman test to identify the use of fixed effects in our analysis rather than random effects. 
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             (1) 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 5. Our results show that after controlling 
for other factors, an increase in intellectual capital disclosure corresponds to an increase in 
analyst following. We report significant and positive coefficients for ICD. The coefficient of 
0.0973 indicates that, all else equal, a firm which increases its intellectual capital disclosure by 1 
unit would have 0.09 more analysts following it. Our results indicate that as information 
asymmetry goes down, as a result of higher intellectual capital disclosure, analysts are tempted to 
follow the firm. Our result is consistent with prior literature that documents higher analyst 
following for firms with low information asymmetries (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 
1999). Prior literature argues that analysts are reluctant to follow firms with high information 
asymmetry due to their concerns regarding their reputation (Stickel, 1992; Hong and Kubik, 
2003). Furthermore, we show that most of the control variables are insignificant except size and 
operational complexity. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
There may be concerns that the results reported in Table 5 are confined to certain stocks. 
For example, one can argue that small firms exhibit more information asymmetries and therefore 
are the ones that should benefit the most from improvement in intellectual capital disclosure. In 
order to address such concerns, we split our sample into two groups, one group with size higher 
than the median size of the sample and the other with size lower than the median size. We re-
estimate Equation (1) for both sub-samples. The results are reported in Table 6. The results 
confirm our previous findings of higher intellectual capital disclosure leads to higher analyst 
following. Our results show significantly positive coefficient of ICD for both sub samples.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5. Discussion of results 
 
	   11	  
In this section, we re-estimate Equation (1) by replacing ICD with individual components 
of intellectual capital disclosure. These components are related to employees, customers, IT, 
processes, research and development, and strategic statements. The results of our analysis are 
reported in Table 7. Our results show that intellectual capital disclosure related to employees and 
strategic statements are significant determinants of analyst following. However, intellectual 
capital disclosure related to strategic statements turns insignificant when we add all components 
together in a model. We also show that intellectual capital disclosure related to customers, IT, 
processes, and research and development are insignificant determinants of analyst following. 
Some of these results are surprising because we believe that intellectual capital disclosure related 
research and development should be the most important component of value generated by 
biotechnology firms. Insignificance of this component may indicate relative inability of analysts 
to understand technology used in the sector. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article documents the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and analyst 
following for biotechnology firms listed at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange during the period 
between 2001 and 2010. We document that analysts are more likely to follow firms with high 
intellectual capital disclosure. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts wish to 
follow those firms that are more transparent. Transparency allows analysts to issue more accurate 
forecasts and recommendations. Further, this article argues that intellectual capital disclosure 
improves the information environment of a firm by disclosing some of the value relevant 
information. Analysts are inclined to use this extra information and increase their following of 
such firms. Our results also show that intellectual capital disclosure related to employees and 
strategic statements are the most important disclosures for analysts. We show that analysts are 
more likely to follow firms with high intellectual capital disclosure related to employees and 
strategic statements. All other components of intellectual capital disclosure are insignificant. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for intellectual capital disclosure 
Following table documents the descriptive statistics for intellectual capital disclosure of biotechnology firms listed 
at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010.  
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation No. of Firm 
2001 17.75 15.38 10.17 13 
2002 23.27 23.08 12.66 13 
2003 21.79 23.08 10.23 13 
2004 21.34 21.15 9.54 16 
2005 20.86 19.23 9.47 18 
2006 19.16 19.23 6.94 19 
2007 19.02 17.95 6.72 19 
2008 19.02 19.23 7.44 19 
2009 21.86 20.51 7.45 19 
2010 19.77 16.67 6.48 19 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for analyst following 
Following table documents the descriptive statistics for analyst following of biotechnology firms listed at the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010.  
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation No. of Firms 
2001 8.80 9.50 6.26 10 
2002 11.70 12.00 7.80 10 
2003 10.90 9.50 8.96 10 
2004 10.00 8.00 7.09 11 
2005 10.33 9.50 7.93 12 
2006 10.84 9.00 8.44 13 
2007 9.50 8.50 7.95 14 
2008 9.92 10.00 7.57 14 
2009 10.61 11.00 7.42 13 
2010 12.30 13.00 9.09 13 
 
 
 
	   17	  
Table 3: Statistics for control variables 
Following table documents the statistics for control variables used in regression analysis. The sample consists of 
biotechnology firms listed at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010. Panel A 
documents the descriptive statistics for the control variables, while Panel B documents correlation between control 
variables. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation No. of Observations 
SIZE 14.42 14.77 2.14 159 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.15 0.41 159 
COMP 0.38 0.38 0.07 144 
EPS 4.60 2.10 7.22 129 
PoR 13.40 0.00 17.14 153 
HISTRET 0.01 -0.02 0.50 124 
HISTEPS 4.42 2.20 7.19 115 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 SIZE LEVERAGE COMP EPS PoR HISTRET HISTEPS 
SIZE 1.00       
LEVERAGE 0.02 1.00      
COMP -0.04 0.15 1.00     
EPS 0.46 0.38 0.10 1.00    
PoR 0.50 -0.01 0.07 0.38 1.00   
HISTRET 0.13 0.10 -0.11 0.13 0.01 1.00  
HISTEPS 0.34 0.31 -0.02 0.45 0.14 -0.02 1.00 
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Table 4: Univariate analysis: Relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and analyst following 
Following table documents the difference between analysts following of high intellectual capital disclosure firms 
and low intellectual capital disclosure firms. High intellectual capital disclosure is defined as above the median 
disclosure, while low intellectual capital disclosure is below the median disclosure. The sample consists of 
biotechnology firms listed at Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010. The 
coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *.  
 
 Intellectual Capital Disclosure  
 High Low Difference 
Average Analyst Following 12.39 8.30 4.09*** No. of Observation 61 62 
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Table 5: Multivariate analysis: Relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and analyst following 
Following table documents the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and analyst following for 
biotechnology firms listed at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange using panel regression with fixed effects. The sample 
period is from 2001 to 2010. The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, 
and coefficients with 10% by *.  
 
  
ICD 0.0973** 
  
SIZE 1.1369** 
LEVERAGE -1.2563 
COMP 6.5952* 
EPS 0.0368 
PoR 0.0253 
HISTRET 0.1448 
HISTEPS 0.0305 
  
Year Dummies Included 
  
No. of Observations 99 
R-Square (Within) 0.4492 
F-Value 3.52 
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Table 6: Relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and analyst following for sub-samples of large 
and small firms 
Following table documents the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and analyst following for sun-
samples of large and small biotechnology firms listed at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange using panel regression 
with fixed effects. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010. The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by 
***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *.  
 
 Large Firms Small Firms 
ICD 0.1259** 0.1238*** 
   
SIZE 0.5218 0.7599 
LEVERAGE -20.1151** 5.9664 
COMP 2.2374 5.3078** 
EPS -0.1184 0.0191 
PoR -0.0085 0.1087 
HISTRET -0.4063 -0.3495 
HISTEPS 0.0415 0.0041 
   
Year Dummies Included Included 
   
No. of Observations 56 43 
R-Square (Within) 0.4919 0.6572 
F-Value 1.94 2.28 
 
 
